Analysis of the legislative process, regulatory effects and the consistency of public arguments with the documentary record
The audit examines the legislative process concerning the Polish Crypto-Assets Market Act, compares the presidential draft — Sejm paper No. 2528 — with the government draft No. 2529, and assesses the significance of the successive vetoes exercised by the President of the Republic of Poland in the context of the implementation of MiCA and the crisis affecting ZondaCrypto’s operator, BB Trade Estonia OÜ.
The documentary record does not support the claim that the presidential draft was prepared to protect the interests of a specific crypto-asset exchange, nor that the successive vetoes resulted from corrupt influence exerted by the crypto sector. Nor was it demonstrated that ZondaCrypto authored draft No. 2528.
The audit does, however, indicate that the presidential draft represented a distinctly more deregulatory model of MiCA implementation, providing stronger procedural safeguards for supervised entities. The most characteristic differences compared with the government model concerned, among other matters, a lower cap on supervisory costs, a shorter maximum blocking period, prior review by an administrative court, very short statutory deadlines for the KNF, State Treasury liability for unlawful blocking measures, and lower or less severe sanctions in certain areas.
The basic client-protection mechanisms — including segregation of client funds, protection of client assets, disclosure obligations, complaint procedures and mechanisms for the transfer of assets — were, however, also present in the government model. It was therefore not demonstrated that draft No. 2528 provided clients with systemically broader protection than the government draft.
Particular significance attaches to the situation that arose after 1 July 2026, following the expiry of the maximum MiCA transitional period. The absence of national implementing legislation meant that Poland lacked a complete domestic licensing architecture for the crypto-asset market. Domestic entities that had previously operated on the basis of the former VASP registration could no longer continue their activities solely on that basis and, at the same time, could not obtain a Polish MiCA authorisation, whereas providers authorised in another Member State could continue to rely on the EU passporting mechanism.
The audit does not conclude that the earlier entry into force of the Polish legislation would have prevented the ZondaCrypto crisis. Such a conclusion would be counterfactual. It can, however, be stated that earlier adoption of the legislation would have provided Polish authorities with a broader set of enforcement tools and would have enabled the establishment of a complete national framework for the implementation of MiCA before the expiry of the transitional period.
KEY FINDINGS
• Presidential draft No. 2528 was in fact considered by Parliament together with other drafts concerning the crypto-asset market.
• The basic client-protection mechanisms were, to a significant extent, common to both the presidential and government models.
• The most characteristic differences in draft No. 2528 strengthened safeguards for supervised entities vis-à-vis the regulator and reduced certain supervisory burdens.
• No systemic preference for Polish CASPs over foreign providers was demonstrated.
• It was not demonstrated that ZondaCrypto authored the presidential draft, nor was evidence established of corrupt influence by that company over its content.
• The participation of industry representatives in consultations and in the regulatory debate is documented, but does not in itself constitute evidence of unlawful influence on the legislative process.
• It cannot be established that the earlier entry into force of the legislation would have prevented the ZondaCrypto crisis.
• After 1 July 2026, the absence of Polish implementing legislation created a genuine institutional gap and a competitive asymmetry between domestic entities without MiCA authorisation and foreign CASPs able to rely on an EU passport.
Translation of the original Polish version. The original Polish version is authoritative.